Chapter 10: Trusts and Estates by Hern, Joseph L.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1978 Article 13
1-1-1978
Chapter 10: Trusts and Estates
Joseph L. Hern
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons
Recommended Citation
Hern, Joseph L. (1978) "Chapter 10: Trusts and Estates," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1978, Article 13.
CHAPTER 10 
Trusts and Estates 
JOSEPH L. HERN" 
§10.1. Wills: Execution: Bequest to Spouse of Su scribing Witness. 
In Rosenbloom v. Kofosky,l the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the judg-
ment of the probate court voiding a bequest to the spo se of a subscrib-
ing witness. The will at issue left all the testator's roperty in equal 
shares to his three daughters, who were his next of ki .2 The husband 
of one of the daughters was one of the three subscri ing witnesses to 
the will. 3 As the law then stood, three disintereste witnesses were 
required for a will to be valid.4 Thus, the probat court, applying 
chapter 191, section 2,r. voided this bequest.6 The be eficiary appealed, 
claiming that chapter 191, section 2, should have be n interpreted to 
void only that much of a bequest to a witness' spou e as exceeds the 
share that person would have taken, had the decede t died intestate.7 
In the circumstances of this case, such an interpret tion would have 
validated the entire· bequest.8 
" JOSEPH L. HERN is Executive Editor of the BosToNI COLLEGE LAW RE-
VIEW, in charge of the ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LA 
§ 10.1. 1 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2534, 369 N.E.2d 1142. 
2 Id. at 2534-35, 369 N.E.2d at 1142. 
3 Id. at 2535, 369 N.E.2d at 1142. 
4 See G.L. c. 191, § 1, before its amendment by Acts o 1976, c. 515, § 3, 
which required three subscribing witnesses to a will. The 976 amendment re-
duced the required number of subscribing witnesses to two. 
5 G.L. c. 191, § 2 now reads: 
Any person of sufficient understanding shall be deemed be a competent 
witness to a will, notwithstanding any common law disqual' cation for interest 
or otherwise; but a beneficial devise or legacy to a subscri ing witness or to 
the husband or wife of such witness shall be void unless t ere are two other 
subscribing witnesses to the will who are not similarly be efited thereunder. 
As it applied to Rosenbloom, § 2 required three disinterested ubscribing witnesses 
in order to m.~ke the intt•rested witness's hectm•st good. Aets >f 1976, c. 515, § 5 
merely changed the word "three" to "two" in the second claus , leaving the statute 
otherwise intact. 
6 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2535, 369 N.E.2d at 1143. 
7 Id. at 2535-37, 369 N.E.2d at 1143. See, e.g., Estate o Reichenberger, 272 
Wis. 176, 74 N.W.2d 740 (1956) (interpreting Wxs. STA. ANN. § 853.07(2) 
(West); Davis v. Davis, 208 S.C. 182, 37 S.E.2d 530 ( 194 ) (interpreting S.C. 
CODE § 19-260). 
8 See text at note 2 supra. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court, in response to this contention, noted 
initially the common law rule that if a subscribing witness was a taker 
under the will, the will itself was void unless there were sufficient wit-
nesses to the execution without the interested witness.n It then set out 
the three legislative responses to the common law rule allowing the taker 
to serve as a witness, thereby validating the will, but affecting that 
person's bequest. The first approach voids only the amount of the 
bequest that exceeds what would have been the witness's intestate 
share. 10 The second approach extends this rule to the spouse of the 
witness, the spouse receiving only what would have been his or her 
intestate share as if no will had been established.U The third approach 
is that of Massachusetts, which also validates the will but voids in its 
entirety the bequest to the witness or the witness's spouse.12 
The Court felt unable to make chapter 191, section 2, fit either the 
first or the second approach, fully recognizing that the statute operates 
to defeat a testator's intent when applied.13 Since the language of sec-
tion 2 is "clear and unambiguous," it is to be construed according to 
the "usual and natural meaning" of the words used by the legislature.14 
Here the plain meaning of section 2 was to void entirely the bequest 
at issue. The Court went on to note that when the legislature last 
amended section 2, it did not disturb the void bequest provision.15 
Thus, the Court presumed that the legislature's silence on this issue in-
dicated that it adopted the Court's earlier interpretation 16 that a bequest 
to an interested witness is enirely void.17 
The Court in Rosenbloom correctly refused to assign a new interpreta-
tion to section 2. The statute as it then and now reads admits of no 
other construction. Thus, the legislature should consider amending sec-
tion 2 to bring it in line with the more liberal view that validates at 
least part of the bequest and thereby gives effect to the testator's intent 
without impairing the wills act's policy of requiring disinerested sub-
scribing witnesses.18 
9 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2535, 369 N.E.2d at 1143 (citing 2 W. PAGE, WILLS 
§ 19.76 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960) ). 
10 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2536, 369 N.E.2d at 1143 (citing C'AL. PROB. ConE 
§ 51 (West); N.Y. DECEDE;\/T EsTATE LAw § 27 (McKinney); T. ATKINSON, WILLS 
§ 65, at 315 (2d ed. 1953); 1 W. PAGE, THE LAw OF WILLs§ 335 (3d ed. 1941)). 
11 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2536, 369 N.E.2d at 1143 (citing Davis and Reichen-
berger and codes). 
12 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2536, 369 N.E.2d at 1143 (citing G.L. c. 191, § 2, 
and N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 551:3). 
13 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2537, 369 N.E.2d at 1143. 
14 Id. at 2537-38, 369 N.E.2d at 1144. 
15 Id. at 2538-39. See note 5 supra. 
16 See Powers v. Cod wise, 172 Mass. 425, 426, 52 N .E. 525 ( 1899). 
17 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2539, 369 N.E.2d at 1144. 
18 See text at notes 10-11 supra. 2
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I 
I 
§10.2. Revocation of Will: Probate Decrees: Vaca~ion by Probate 
Court. On a petition for further appellate review, the Supreme Judicial 
Court upheld the Appeals Court's decision in the proce1durally complex case of Olsson v. Waite. 1 The dispute centered aroun the probate of 
an executed carbon copy of Ann Francis' wilJ.2 On J nuary 13, 1972, 
some two months after a bitter divorce proceeding which resulted in a 
decree nisi, Mrs. Francis executed a will and copy leaving all her 
property to Olsson, a friend of the Francis family, and naming Olsson 
her executor. 3 The will recited that the testatrix was !leaving nothing 
to her former husband or her daughter Christine Wait~.4 At that time 
Mrs. Francis harbored bad feelings toward her daughter, who had testi-
fied against her mother in the divorce proceeding.5 The executed orig-
inal was delivered to Mrs. Francis, and the executed carbon copy was 
kept by her attorney.6 Four months later, and two ~eeks after the 
divorce decree nisi became absolute, Mrs. Francis declarfd to her former 
husband and Christine: "I have torn up my will." 7 
Ten days later Mrs. Francis took her own life.8 Mr. Francis, Olsson, 
and others searched her house but were unable to ~nd the original 
will.9 Olsson then offered for probate the carbon copy f om the lawyer's 
files. 10 The probate court, after two days of hearings, concluded that 
Mrs. Francis' declaration that she had destroyed her will indicated "that 
she wanted her daughter to have all her estate by inheritance, the divorce 
now being absolute and the divorced husband now ha~ing no claim to 
share in her estate." 11 A decree disallowing probate ofl the will offered 
by Olsson was entered on October 17, 1972.12 The Srpreme Judicial 
Court, applying the "plainly erroneous" standard to this finding, upheld 
the probate court's disallowance of the will.13 Moreover, the Court held 
that Olsson's failure to argue the issue of disallowance !efore either the 
Appeals Comt or the Supreme Judicial Court would b deemed to be 
a waiver of the issue.14 This much of the case is straig tforward. The 
§ 10.2. 1 373 Mass. 517, 368 N.E.2d 1194 ( 1977). 
2 Id. at 519, 368 N.E.2d at 1195-96. 
3 Id. at 518-19, 368 N.E.2d at 1195. 
4 Id. at 519, 368 N.E.2d at 1196. 
5 Id., 368 N.E.2d at 1195. 
6 Id., 368 N.E.2d at 1195-96. 
7 Id., 368 N.E.2d at 1196. 
s Id. 
9 Id. 
1o Id. * 11 Id. The quoted language is from the probate judge's fin gs of. fact which 
were filed November 29, 1972. See id. at 519-20, 368 N.E.2d a 1196. 
12 Id. at 519, 368 N.E.2d at 1196. 
13 Id. at 520-21, 368 N.E.2d at 1196-97. 
14 Id. at 521-22, 368 N.E.2d at 1197. Olsson's "waiver" came about because of 
tho proooduml p~ture of tho "''· When tho p<ohate oourt T"" W d~ of 3
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remainder involves convoluted procedural postures stemming from the 
probate court's action after entering its decree of disallowance on Octo-
ber 17, 1972. 
After this decree, Olsson filed an appeal and two weeks later moved 
the probate court • to vacate its decree_l5 The motion was based on 
Olsson's inability to appear at the second day of the probate proceeding 
because he, an attorney, was trying a case in superior court.16 At the 
probate proceeding Olsson was represented by counsel who declined 
to move for a continuance and declined to call Olsson to testify, although 
an arrangement with the superior court judge would have made him 
available to testify.17 Olsson claimed that his counsel was materially 
handicapped by Olsson's absence from the probate proceeding and that 
he was thereby deprived of an adequate presentation of his case.l8 This 
motion was heard and allowed on December 1, 1972,19 on the ground 
that "available evidence was not offered" by Olsson's counsel.20 While 
many other procedural occurrences transpired between this vacation and 
the Supreme Judicial Court's ultimate disposition of the case,21 only the 
propriety of the probate court's vacation of its decree of disallowance 
will be discussed herein. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, noting the strong public policy against 
opening final decrees,22 held that a probate court is powerless to upset 
its own decrees except for "fraud, or mistake, or want of jurisdiction, 
or for any reason adequate in law." 23 The Court stated that the stan-
dards for vacating a probate decree are the same as those for granting 
a bill of review in equity: only for 1) error of law apparent on the 
record, 2) new evidence not susceptible to use at the trial, or 3) a 
matter occurring since the decree.24 The Court then applied these stan-
dards to the December 1 vacation of the October 17 decree. 
disallowance, see text at notes 15-20 infra, the court asked Olsson to seek dismissal of 
his appeal from the decree. The appeal was not dismissed but was withdrawn 
and later revived when Waite appealed. Thus Olsson believed that with the 
underlying decree vacated, he had no reason to argue that the decree should not 
have been given. See id. at 521-24, 368 N.E.2d at 1197-98. 
15 Id. at 523, 368 N.E.2d at 1197-98. 
16 Id. at 524-25, 368 N.E.2d at 1198-99. 
17 !d. at 526-28, 368 N.E.2d at 1199-1200. 
1s !d. at 524-25, 368 N.E.2d at 1198-99. 
19 Id. at 525, 368 N.E.2d at 1199. 
20 Id. at 532, 368 N.E.2d at 1202. 
21 See id. at 521-24, 368 N.E.2d at 1197-98. 
22 I d. at 528-29, 368 N .E.2d at 1201 (quoting Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 202 Mass. 205, 
207,88 N.E. 762 (1909)). 
23 !d. at 529, 368 N.E.2d at 1201 (quoting Goss v. Donnell, 263 Mass. 521, 523-
24, 161 N.E. 896, 897 (1928)). 
24 !d. at 530, 368 N .E.2d at 1201 (quoting Mackay v. Brock, 245 Mass. 131, 
133-34, 139 N.E. 517, 518 (1923) ). 
4
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The grounds on which the judge gave Mr. Olsson elief by vacat-
ing the decree of October 17, 1972, do not qualify s grounds for 
relief under ~ bill of review. The relief was not based on any 
error of law apparent on the record. It was based on the ground 
that his lawyer failed to introduce some evidence hich was then 
known and could have been offered-it was evide ce susceptible . 
of use at the trial and not something which came to light after the 
trial. The basis for the relief granted was not ·so ething which 
arose after the entry of the decree. Therefore, Mr. lsson was en-
titled to no relief by any analogy to a bill of revie in an equity 
suit.25 
The Court concluded that no fraud prevented Olsso from presenting 
his case and therefore that the probate court erred in granting Olsson's 
motion for vacation. Accordingly, the Court affirme the decree dis-
allowing the offered will and reversed the decree that had vacated the 
decree of disallowance. :w 
Justice Braucher dissented, contending that the Co rt did not have 
jurisdiction since the December 1 decree from whic the appeal was 
taken was only interlocutory.!!' In setting forth its arg ment, the dissent 
noted that the Court disregarded the probate judge's intent to order a 
new hearing 28 on the issue of intent to revoke th will.28 Justice 
Braucher further asserted that the Court was making "its own findings 
on the basis of a transcript of conflicting testimony . . . and resolving 
questions of credibility." 2!) Justice Braucher argued that the Court's 
desire to expedite the matter did not justify the Cou finding facts for 
itsel£.30 
§10.3. Wills: Construction: "Heirs," "Items of P rsonal Property." 
Both the Supreme Judicial Court and the Appeals Cou had an occasion 
during the Survey year to interpret language_ used in a will. A common 
theme emerging from the cases is that where a will e ploys legal terms, 
these terms will he interpreted strictly, while more c mmon terms will 
be open to broader interpretation. A corollary to thi approach is that 
extrinsic evidence is more likely to be admissible to hed light on the 
testator's intent when the meaning of common, non legal terminology 
is at issue than when legal terminology is used in a w· I. 
In Gustafson v. Svenson 1 a legal term-heirs per tirpes-was used 
in the will and was given a strict interpretation by the reviewing courts. 
!!a Id. at 530, 368 N.E.2d at 1202. 
26 Id. at 533, 368 N.E.2d at 1203. 
27 Id. at 534, 368 N.E.2d at 1203-04 (Braucher, J., dissenti g). 
!!8 Id., 368 N.E.2d at 1204 (Braucher, J., dissenting). 
29 I d. at 534-35, 368 N .E.2d at 1204 (Braucher, J ., dissenti g). 
ao Id. 
§ 10.3. 1 373 Mass. 273, 366 N.E.2d 761 ( 1977). 
5
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The wills of both Beda and Hilda Anderson 2 made a residuary bequest 
to their brother Enoch J. Anderson or "his heirs per stirpes." a Enoch 
predeceased the testatrices and his wife Martha claimed his shares as 
his sole survivor. 4 In a petition for instruction after proof of the wills, 
the probate court admitted the testimony of the attorney who drafted 
the Anderson sisters' wills. This testimony was to the effect that before 
the wills were executed, the testatrices told the attorney that they did · 
not want Martha to receive Enoch's share of their estates in the event 
Enoch predeceased them.5 On the basis of this evidence the probate 
court decreed that Martha was not entitled to any share in the estates 
of her two sisters-in-law.~> From this decree Martha appealed. 
The Appeals Court had framed the issue as one of whether use of 
the term "per stirpes" was intended to limit the bequests to Enoch's 
blood heirs.' The court noted that the literal meaning of the term is 
"by the roots" or "by stocks"; it imports the taking by the decendants 
of a deceased heir of the same share in the estate of another person as 
their parent would have taken if living.~ The court also noted, how-
ever, that Stceeney v. Kennard n held that a widow would share in a 
bequest to her deceased husband or his "heirs by right of representa-
tion." The Gustafson court stated that "per stirpes" and "by right of 
representation" generally are recognized as having the same legal mean-
ing.10 The court held that the attorney's testimony regarding the testa-
trices' instructions was inadmissible, since these declarations were "apart 
from, in addition to, or in opposition to the legal effect" of the actual 
language of the will. 11 Moreover, the court noted that the residuary 
clauses of the two wills were intended to make an equal distribution to 
the branches of the testatrices' immediate family, that brother Enoch 
never had any issue, and was unlikely to inasmuch as he was 79 and 
Martha was 74 when the wills were executed in 1959.12 In addition to 
the legal effect of the words used, the court concluded that the sisters' 
manifest intention was to include Martha among Enoch's heirs at law 
2 Beda and Hilda Anderson were unmarried sisters whose wills were identical, 
except for provisions providing gifts to each other. They died within several weeks 
of each other, and thus both wills were considered together by the courts. See id. 
at 274, 366 N.E.2d at 761-62. 
a Id. 
4 Id., 366 N.E.2d at 762. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. at 274-75, 366 N.E.2d at 762. 
7 Gustafson v. Svenson, 4 Mass. App. 338, 340, 347 N.E.2d 701, 703 (1976). 
s Id. at 339, 347 N.E.2d at 703. 
o 331 Mass. 542, 120 N.E.2d 910 (1954). 
10 4 Mass. App. at 340, 347 N.E.2d at 703. 
11 I d. (quoting W. PAGE, THE LAw oF WILLS § 32.9 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961) ). 
12 4 Mass. App. at 342, 347 N.E.2d at 704. 
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as provided in. chapter 190, sectioq 1 of the General Laws.13 Accord-
ingly, the decrees of the probate court were reversed.1 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted further appell te review in re-
sponse to the appellee's contention that the Appeals Court had acted 
contrary to the recent decision of McKelvy v. Terry.15 In McKelvy the 
testimony of the attorney who' drafted the will was he d admissible "for 
the purpose of removing ambiguity and illuminating eaning or inten-
tion." 16 At issue was whether the testator had effecti ely demonstrated 
his intention to exercise a testamentary power of a pointment. The 
Appeals Court in Gustafson distinguished McKelvy n the basis that 
the testimo~y there showed the testator's knowledge of his power of 
appointment, his feelings toward the donees (his child en), and his own 
feeling about his father's having deprived him of outr'ght ownership of 
the appointive assetsP The Supreme Judicial Court u held the Appeals 
Court's decision in Gustafson, stating that the latter h d correctly inter-
preted and applied McKelvy. 18 I 
The Court restated the familiar rule that extrinsic tvidence may not 
be used to vary the terms of an unambiguous will,191 This is so even 
though the "unambiguous" language has a fixed lega meaning that is 
not likely to be known by the testator or which may not "correspond" 
to an oral statement of intent.20 Thus, whether or not e testator under-
stood the meaning of legal terms used in his will i irrelevant. The 
Court held that the phrase "his heirs per stirpes" wa not ambiguous: 
the term "heirs" has a fixed legal meaning which incl des a decedant's 
surviving spouse.21 Therefore, the testatrices' stateme ts to the attorney 
that they did not want Enoch's wife Martha to benefi from their estate 
was ineffective, since the will included her by using t e term ''heirs." 22 
Moreover, the words "per stirpes" merely pointed out hat Enoch's heirs 
were to take by right of representation.23 Accordi gly, the probate 
decrees denying Martha Enoch's shares as his so e survivor were 
reversed.24 i 
13 Id. 
"hl i 
15 373 Mass. at 275, 366 N.E.2d at 762. See McKelvy v. T~rry, 370 Mass. 328, 
346 N.E.2d 912 (1976). 
16 370 Mass. at 334, 346 N.E.2d at 915-16. i 
17 4 Mass. App. at 340-41 n.2, 347 N.E.2d at 703-04 n.2. ,
1
· 
18 373 Mass. at 275, 366 N.E.2d at 762. 
19 Id. 
20 I d. (citing Putnam v. Putnam, 366 Mass. 261, 266, 3 6 N.E.2d 729, 734 
( 1974) ). 
21 373 Mass. at 275, 366 N.E.2d at 762. 
22 See text at note 5 supra. 
23 373 Mass. at 275-76, 366 N.E.2d at 762. 
2~ Id. at 276, 366 N.E.2d at 762. 
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While the Court is probably correct in its belief that the term "heirs 
per stirpes" is not ambiguous to lawyers and judges, it can certainly 
be said that the general public, and thus the average testator, is prob-
ably confused as to the legal effect of such terms when included in a 
will. Since the Court has now twice held that the testator's misunder-
standing of terms used in his will is of no import, members of the bar 
must draft their clients' wills and other instruments with a heightened 
sense of responsibility. The attorney has the power to fix dispositive 
schemes directly contrary to the client's wishes. In light of Gustafson, 
then, it is especially important that the attorney choose legal terms care-
fully and that he explain carefully to the client the legal effect of the 
language employed before the client executes the will or other document. 
In the other Survey year case involving interpretation of a will the 
Appeals Court showed more flexibility, but it was construing terms that 
did not have a rigid legal meaning as the terms did in Gustafson. In 
Spring v. Lonigro 25 the meaning of a less legally fixed phrase-"items of 
tangible personal property" 26-was at issue. Article Second of the will 
of Blanche E. Marston was a lengthy disposition of various objects to 
various individuals.27 Besides giving Michael Lonigro a certain billiards 
table, Article Second gave him "his choice of any three ( 3) items of 
tangible personal property not otherwise specifically given hereunder." 28 
Michael selected a stamp collection appraised at $10,890,29 and the 
residuary legatee, a charitable foundation, and the Attorney General 
appealed the decision of the probate court upholding Michael's right to 
select the collection. The Attorney General and the foundation argued 
that the gifts under Article Second should be limited to household and 
personal effects, but the Appeals Court disagreed.30 
Scrutinizing the general testamentary disposition in Marston's will,31 
the court determined that the testatrix intended the term "tangible per-
sonal property" to embrace a much broader category than that urged 
by the residuary legatee. The court found that the testatrix intended 
25 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 135, 372 N.E.2d 1309. 
26 See id. at 136, 372 N.E.2d at 1309-10. 
27 The Appeals Court observed thaf Article Second was divided into seven para-
graphs and many subparagraphs. The first five paragraphs made specific gifts of 
antique furniture, furnishings, jewelry, and silver. The sixth paragraph gave Michael 
the nonspecific bequest at issue ( see text at note 28 infra) and the seventh para-
graph provided, "Any tangible personal property not otherwise disposed of, exclu-
sive of cash, bank deposits, securities and the like, shall be sold by my executors 
and the proceeds of such sale shall be disposed of as part of the remainder of my 
estate." See 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 136, 372 N.E.2d at 1309-10. 
28 See id., 372 N .E.2d at 1309. 
2!1 Id. at 140, 372 N.E.2d at 1311. See note 37 infra. 
30 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 136, 372 N.E.2d at 1310. 
31 See note 27 supra. 
8
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by Article Second to dispose of all her tangible pers nal property ex-
clusive of "cash, bank deposits, securities, and the lik ." 32 The execu-
tors were directed to sell what remained of the includ d personal assets 
after Michael had selected his three items and after th specific legatees 
had received their bequests and then turn the proceeds ver to the residu-
ary legatee.33 Given the testatrix's intent to make a nal disposition of 
her personal estate-as she defined it in Article Secon -the court held 
that "tangible personal property" was not restricted t "household and 
personal effects" 34 and therefore included testatrix's tamp collection.35 
The residuary legatee also contended that the stamp collection did not 
constitute "an item" of tangible personal property. 36 T e court reasoned, 
however, that the testatrix would not have considered the collection "as 
representing tens of thousands of units" but rather wf,uld have consid-
ered it as a single unit.8 i This was suggested by testatr x's gift in another 
article of her "tape measure collection." 38 The court oted that various 
other legatees received gifts of similar value to the tamp collection.39 
Finally, the court noted that the general testamentar plan would not 
be destroyed: since the foundation was to receive app oximately $1,000,-
000, Michael's selection of a stamp collection apprais d at $10,890 did 
not render his gift disproportionate vis-a-vis that to the foundation.40 
Thus, the Spring court encountered little difficulty in giving the testa-
trix's words a broad interpretation which very likely r fleeted the testa-
trix's intent. 
§10.4. Executors and Administrators: Permissible 
tion of Chapter 197, Section 1. During the Survey 
Judicial Court considered whether an executor or 
waive the protection against actions brought against 
aiver of Protec-
ear, the Supreme 
dministrator may 
the estate within 
32 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 137, 372 N.E.2d at 1310J See note 27 supra. 
3a 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 136, 372 N.E.2d at 131~. 
34 Id. at 137, 372 N.E.2d at 1310. i 
35 Id. The court noted that courts of other jurisdictions ~ave reached varying 
results when deciding what constitutes "household and perso a! effects." See id. 
at 138, 372 N.E.2d at 1310 for cases cited. The court prope ly refused to decide 
the meaning of that phrase, since the testatrix did not even us , those words. Id. 
36 Id. at 138, 372 N.E.2d at 1310. i 
3i Id. at 138-39, 372 N.E.2d at 1310-11. The collection~'consisted of tens of 
thousands of stamps, including postage, documentary, reven e, war ration, and 
broadcasting station stamps. The probate judge said that a phi atelist had examined 
the collection and concluded that the testatrix "collected an accumulated every 
stamp that came her way." Id. j 
38 Id. at 139-40, 372 N.E.2d at 1311. 
39 Id. at 140, 372 N.E.2d at 1311. One presumes that the egatee who received 
the tape measure collection was not put in that category sole y by receipt at that 
bequest. 
~u I . 
I 
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three months of the administrator's becoming qualified.1 In Kofinke v. 
Maranhas 2 the Court held that the protection of chapter 197, section 1, 
may be waived and determined further that a waiver had been made 
under the circumstances of the case. 
The original plaintiff, Laura May Ross,3 commenced an action in the 
District Court of Brockton against the executor of the estate of Francisco 
Maranhas to recover for services rendered to the decedent before his 
death.4 The action was commenced on June 3, 1974, less than three 
months after the executor had given bond and thus was subject to dis-
missal under chapter 197, section 1,5 The defendant-administrator's at-
torney, however, assured the plaintiff's attorney that an answer would be 
filed and that the plaintiff need not bring a new action.6 When the answer 
was filed, however, the defendant alleged merely "that the plaintiff's 
action was not commenced in accordance with the proper statute of 
limitations." 7 In November 1975, Kofinke was substituted as plaintiff 
for Laura Ross when a new complaint was filed. 8 In May 1976, the de-
fendant flied a late answer to the substituted complaint, again pleading 
the statute of limitations,n and in June he successfully moved for a dis-
missal on the grounds that the action had been commenced contrary to 
chapter 197, section 1.10 · 
The district court granted the motion.U Because it ruled that an 
administrator may not waive the protection of chapter 197, section 1, 
the court did not reach the issue of whether the defendant had at-
tempted a waiver.12 The appellate division held that a waiver was 
possible but because the defendant's original answer pleaded the statute, 
§ 10.4. 1 See G.L. c. 197, § 1. 
2 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1165, 375 N.E.2d 712. 
3 Ross died after she brought the action, and her administrator was substituted 
as plaintiff. Id. See text at note 8 infra. 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1166, 375 N.E.2d at 712. The claim was for the 
value of services Ross had provided the decedent between 1938 and 1969, when 
plaintiff became disabled. The complaint alleged that the decedent had promised 
to leave Ross his house and all he owned if he predeceased her, in exchange for 
her housekeeping services. In fact the decedent made no provision for Ross what-
ever. Id. 
5 Id. 
6 Id., 375 N.E.2d at 713. 
7 Id. Just which statute of limitations the defendant meant caused the Court 
some difficulty. See text and note at note 19 infra. 
8 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1167, 375 N.E.2d at 713. 
9 Id. This answer, more specific than the answer cited in the text at note 7 
supra, stated that "the causes of action set forth by the plaintiff in her complaint 
are barred by the provisions of the Mass. General Laws limiting the period of 
time for the institution of complaints against the decedent's administrator." Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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there was no waiver in the case.13 Because this answer had been filed 
before the nine-month statute of limitations had r.un,14 the appellate 
division saw no application of equitable estoppel against the defendant.15 
The Supreme Judicial Court, agreeing with the appilate division, held 
that the protection against actions afforded to an ex cutor or adminis-
trator for his first three months may be waived.16 T e Court reasoned 
that section 1, unlike section 9, is not a jurisdiction I bar. While an 
executor or administrator may not waive the section statute of limita-
tions, the Court saw no reason why this result should obtain with the 
section 1 statute of limitations. 
The purpose of the statutory requirement of forbearance is to af-
ford an executor or administrator time to assess the status of the 
estate and to review claims against it, while free f om the burdens 
of litigation. If an executor or administrator does ot wish to take 
advantage of the statutory restraint, he may dedi e to do so, and 
the case may proceed as if seasonably brought. Th situation where 
an action is brought too late under G.L. c. 197, § , is different be-
cause there waiver would subject the estate to a cl im which could 
be forever barred. . . . A premature action ... stands in a different 
posture because a plaintiff who has sued too early may correct the 
error, and the asserted claim is not forever foreclosed.H 
Having held that the statute of limitations could be waived, the Court 
turned to the issue of whether or not there had bee~ an actual waiver. 
The situation was murky because the defendant ff.rmally pleaded a 
statutory bar after he had said there would be no ne d for the plaintiff 
to reinstitute the action.18 The Court held that ther was a waiver for 
two reasons. The first was that the defendant's .fir t answer was not 
specific enough to call the plaintiff's attention to th fact that the de-
fendant had changed his mind.19 Secondly, while the answer to the 
substituted complaint clearly referred to section 1, the period for filing 
13 Id. 
14 See G.L. c. 197, § 9; 
15 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1167-68, 375 N.E.2d at 713. 
16 Id. at 1168-69, 375 N.E.2d at 713. 
HM ' 
18 See text at notes 5-7 supra. I 
19 The Court pointed out that the defendant's vague ple+.ding of "the proper 
statute of limitations" (see text at note 7 supra) could easily ~ave been interpreted 
as referring to the claim for services extending back as far as 1938. Since 
the defendant's attorney .had told plaintiff's attorney that he need not recommence 
the action after three months had expired, the Court stated that it would not "con-
strue the answer as adequately raising the very defense so recently disclaimed." 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1169, 375 N.E.2d at 714. Compare the specificity of the 
answer to the original complaint, set forth in text at note 7 supra, with that of the 
answer to the substituted complaint, set forth in note 9 su~. 
I 
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an action under section 9 had already expired. 20 The Court concluded 
that the plaintiff's continued reliance on the early representation of the 
defendant's counsel was reasonable and that the defendant should there-
fore be estopped from raising the defense of section 9.21 
§10.5. Charitable Trusts: Cy Pres. Questions relating to the doctrine 
of cy pres reached the Supreme Judicial Court in a variety of circwn-
stances during the Survey year. The Court was faced with important 
constitutional questions arising from proposed legislative application of 
cy pres to a bequest by Benjamin Franklin, 1 a case raising jurisdictional 
questions under the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act,2 
and a case involving traditional questions of cy pres.3 
The will of Benjamin Franklin, probated in 1790,4 left one thousand 
pounds in trust to the Town of Boston to be invested in loans to young 
married artisans.n After one hundred years of accumulation, the man-
agers were to expend a portion of the fund on certain public works.6 
The balance was to be accumulated for another hundred years, or until 
1991, at which time one-fourth of the fund was to be disposed of by the 
inhabitants of the Town of Boston and three-fourths by the government 
of the state.7 
At the end of the first hundred years of the trust the managers with-
drew a portion of the fund.8 In 1905, with the aid of a grant from Andrew 
Carnegie, they established the Franklin Technical Institute.0 In 1908, 
the General Court incorporated the managers as the Franklin Founda-
tion.10 
In Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives the Court 
considered the constitutionality of proposed legislation that would bring 
about an early disposition of Franklin's bequest.11 The legislation 
!!O 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1170, 375 N.E.2d at 714. 
:n Id. 
§ 10.5: 1 See Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 1978 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1, 371 N.E.2d 1349, discussed at text at notes 4-28 infra. 
!! See Williams College v. Attorney General, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1265, 375 
N.E.2d 1225, discussed at text at notes 29-47 infra. The Uniform Management of 
Institutional Funds Act can he found at G.L. c. 184A. 
s See First Church in Somerville v. Attorney General, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 
376 N.E.2d 1226, discussed at text at notes 48-65 infra. 
4 See Franklin Foundation v. Attorney General, 340 Mass. 197, 199, 163 N.E.2d 
662, 665 ( 1960). 
li 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3, 371 N.E.2d at 1351-52. 
o Id., 371 N.E.2d at 3152. 
7 Id. 
s Id. 
9 Id. 
1o Id. at 4, 371 .N.E.2d at 1352. 
11 See House Bill No. 5503, summarized in Opinion "of the Justices, 1978 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. at 1-2, 371 N.E.2d at 1351. 
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would have allowed the trustees of the Franklin Foundation and the 
City of Boston to transfer all the assets of the fund, fncluding the In-
stitute, to Boston University, which had exhibited inter~st in taking over 
the Institute.12 The bid did not contemplate an early termination of the 
fund itself, but it would have allowed the City of BoFton, through the 
City Council, to make a present designation of the 'university as re-
cipient of the City's share in the principal due to be distributed in 
1991.13 In like manner, the bill would have designa~ed the university 
as recipient of the Commonwealth's share in the pri~cipal which was 
also due to be distributed in 1991.14 1 
The House of Representatives asked the Court: 1) whether enactment 
of the bill, without a petition from the City of Bost~m, would violate 
the Home Rule Amendment,1" 2) whether authorizing the assignment 
or designation of the City's interest prior to 1991 would violate the 
separation of powers provision of the Massachusetts ponstitution,1G 3) 
whether the assignment or designation by the Comfr1onwealth of its 
interest prior to 1991 would also violate the separation of powers provi-
sion, 17 and 4) whether the legislation would be contrary to the "anti-
aid" amendment 18 or the constitutional mode for ma~ing appropriation 
of public money. 19 
In response to the first question, the Court found that the proposed 
legislation would indeed violate the Home Rule Arne dment. The bill 
would have implications only for the City of Boston a d would "drama-
tically alter" the ordinary processes for disposing of bequests and devises 
to the City.20 Normally, the Mayor and City Counc~l acting together 
may expend gifts of funds, and the City charter call~ for a two-thirds 
vote of the City Council to dispose of most city real estate.21 The bill, 
however, would have allowed a majority of the CouTil to make these 
dispositions.22 
1 
In response to the second and third questions, the Court noted that 
the bill would change the trustees and possibly the ~eneficiaries of the 
Franklin bequest.~a The Court determined that thif would overstep 
12 See 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1-2, 371 N.E.2d at 1351. 
13 See id. at 2, 371 N.E.2d at 1351. 
14 See id. 
15 See MAss. CoNsT. amend. art. LXXXIX 
16 See MAss. CoNST. pt. 1, art. XXX. 
17 See id. 
I 
(formerly amenJ. art. II, § 8). 
18 See MAss. CoNST. amend. art. XLVI. J 
19 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 4-5, 371 N.E.2d at 1352. See tp:Ass. CoNST. amend. 
art. LXII, §§ 1 and 3. 
20 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 8-9, 371 N.E.2d at 1353-54. 
21 Id., 371 N.E.2d at 1354. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 11, 371 N.E.2d at 1354. 
I. 
I 
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the legislature's power to deal with charitable tmsts, and would thus 
constitute an impermissible exercise of cy pres, a function reserved to 
the judiciary under the separation of powers.24 
Finally, in answering the fourth question, the Court determined that 
the "anti-aid" amendment would not be violated. That provision forbids 
the use of public money to aid private institutions. Since the Franklin 
fund was created by a private gift, rather than by tax assessments, the 
Court held that the fund did not constitute "public money" within the 
meaning of article XLVJ.25 As for the appropriations issue, the Court 
reasoned that while article LXIII requires all money received by the 
Commonwealth to be paid into the state treasury and disbursed through 
a general appropriation bill, the Commonwealth could nevertheless desig-
nate its interest in the fund to the university consistent with article 
LXIII.26 This designation was permissible because the Commonwealth 
had never "received" any money from the fund and never would unless 
it appointed itself beneficiary in 1991,2i The Court concluded, however, 
that its answers to the earlier questions were dispositive of the issue, 
and therefore the legislation could not be constitutionally enacted.28 
Another cy pres matter before the Court this Survey year was the 
constmction to be given chapter 180A of the General Laws.29 In Wil-
liams College v. Attorney General,~0 the college sought an order of the 
probate court that would release separate investment restrictions con-
tained in trust instruments created by deceased donors. The restrictions 
prevented the college from investing the funds with its consolidated 
endowment fund and were described by the college as "obsolete, inap-
propriate, and impracticable." 31 Since the donors, being deceased, were 
unable to lift the restrictions, Williams sought relief under chapter 180A, 
section 9.32 The Attorney General appeared and assented to the pro-
24 Id. at 11-15, 371 N.E.2d at 1354-56. 
25 Id. at 16-18, 371 N.E.2d at 1356-57. 
26 Id. at 18, 371 N.E.2d at 1357-58. 
27 Id., 371 N.E.2d at 1357. 
2s Id. at 19, 371 N.E.2d at 1358. 
29 G.L. c. 180A, the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, was added 
by Acts of 1975, c. 886. 
3o 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1265, 375 N.E.2d 1225. 
31 Id. at 1265-66, 375 N.E.2d at 1227. 
32 G.L. c. 180A, § 9 reads in part: 
With the written consent of the donor, the governing board [i.e., the body 
responsible for the management of an institution or institutional fund] may 
release, in whole or in part, a restriction imposed by the applicable gift instru-
ment on the use or investment of an institutional fund. 
If written consent of the donor cannot be obtained by reason of his death, 
disability, unavailability, or impossibility of identification, the governing board 
may apply in the name of the institution to a court of competent jurisdiction 
for release of a restriction imposed by the applicable gift instrument on the 
14
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posed changes, but the Berkshire probate judge reporte to the Supreme 
Judicial Court questions regarding jurisdiction, venue, and notice.33 
The Court held that the phrase "court of compete t jurisdiction'' as 
it appears in section 9 34 embraces a probate collrt.35 The Court rea-
soned that since chapter 215, section 6 invests pro ate courts with 
general equitable jurisdiction, the relief sought-relea e of separate in-
vestment restrictions-is akin to modification of a c aritable trust in-
strument and is thus "subject to the general equitab e powers of the 
courts." 36 
The probate court, situated in Berkshire County, ask d whether it was 
the proper forum for resolving questions arising from nter vivos instru- · 
ments created outside the commonwealth and outside B rkshire County.37 
It also asked the same question with respect to testa entary bequests 
hom wills probated outside the commonwealth and outside Berkshire 
County. 38 The Court held that venue was proper in t ree of the above 
instances: the action was transitory and therefore co ld be brought in 
the county where one of the parties lives or has a usual place of business. 
Since Williams College's usual place of business is in erkshire County, 
venue was proper with that county's probate court w th respect to the 
inter vivos trusts and with respect to testamentary trust of wills probated 
in Massachusetts.30 Because the issue did not arise in the case, the 
Court declined to rule on whether its holding woul extend to trusts 
created by wills probated outside of Massachusetts.40 
Another venue question posed by the probate cou was whether it 
was the proper forum for the section 9 action wher the donors and 
the trust "are strangers to the probate court in the se se that the trust 
institution, in its formation and operation, and the gi ts to it, were all 
without the judicial aegis of the Berkshire Probate Co rt." 41 The Court 
use or investment of an institutional fund. The Attorney I General shall be 
notified of the application and shall be given an opportunit>f to be heard. If 
the court finds that the restriction is obsolete, inappropriatej or impracticable, 
it may by order release the restriction in whole or in part.l A release under 
this subsection may not change an endowment fund to a fllnd that is not an 
endowment fund. i 
i 
This section does not limit the application of the doctrine iof cy pres, 
33 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1266, 375 N.E.2d at 1227. I 
34 See note 32 supra. 1 
35 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1268-69, 375 N.E.2d at 1227-281 
36 Id. at 1268, 375 N.E.2d at 1228. 
37 Id. at 1269, 375 N.E.2d at 1228. One of the trust fun s came from a trust 
instrument made in New York. Id. 
38 Id. at 1270, 375 N.E.2d at 1228. 
39 Id. at 1269-70, 375 N.E.2d at 1228. I 
4o Id. at 1270, 375 N.E.2d at 1228. 
o~ I 
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again held that venue was proper. It did not appear that any other 
probate court had taken jurisdiction over any case involving the inter 
vivos gifts; had such an event occurred, then jurisdiction would have 
remained with that other probate court.42 As for the testamentary 
trusts created by wills probated in Suffolk County,43 the Court did not 
find probate by another court to bar exercise of jurisdiction by the 
Berkshire Probate Court. Although chapter 215, section 7 gave the 
Suffolk Probate Court exclusive jurisdiction over the proof of these wills 
and administration of the estates, "[t]he earlier probate proceedings 
ended with the final distribution of the property to the college." 44 The 
Court emphasized the distinction between release of investment and use 
restrictions on the one hand and probate of a donor's will on the other.45 
Finally, the Court ruled that due process does not require giving 
notice of the action to anyone other than the Attorney General, since 
it would not be possible to serve notice on the donors.46 The Court 
noted here that Williams only sought release of separate investment 
restrictions, an alteration that did not affect anyone else.47 
In another case decided during the Swrvey year the Supreme }1,1dicial 
Court held that the doctrine of cy pres is inapplicable to a will contain-
ing conditions and providing for gifts over in the event of the bene-
ficiary's failure to fulfill the conditions. In First Church in Somerville 
v. Attorney Geneml, 48 the Court considered the will of Columbus Tyler, 
admitted to probate in 1881. Tyler left the residue of his estate to the 
First Congregational Society of Somerville, of which he was a founder. 49 
The Society was to use the bequest to deposit annually a sum into a 
savings bank for each boy or girl who regularly attended sabbath school 
sessions, to distribute flowers and decorate the church, to expend up to 
$100 to repair buildings, and to provide other specified services.50 The 
principal was not to be spent, and excess income was to go to Harvard 
College for scholarships to its theological school and to Massachusetts 
General Hospital "1 for its affiliate the McLean Asylum, where Tyler 
and his wife had worked for many years.52 Tyler provided gifts over 
42 Id. at 1270-71 and n.5, 375 N.E.2d at 1229 and n.5. 
43 See id. at 1271, 375 N.E.2d at 1229. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 1272, 375 N.E.2d at 1229. 
47 Id. 
48 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1443, 376 N.E.2d 1226. 
49 Id. at 1445, 376 N.E.2d at 1228. 
uo Id. 
51 Id. at 1445-46, 376 N.E.2d at 1228-29. 
52 Id. at 1448-49, 376 N.E.2d at 1230. 
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to Harvard and Massachusetts General in the event the Society failed 
to use the bequest according to the set conditions.53 I 
I 
The Somerville Society, by then known as the First I Church in Somer-
ville, was dissolved in 1975. Most of its assets, including restricted 
funds, were transferred to the Unitarian Universalist Association.54 In 
a complaint for instructions or application of cy pr~s brought by the 
First Church and the Association against the donees of the gifts over 
and the Attorney General, a single justice of the Supr me Judicial Court 
ordered that the gifts over be made. 55 The Association, joined by the 
Attorney General, appealed.56 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.57 It determ~ned first that the 
bequest to the "Society and its successors and assign forever" did not 
prevent the gift from failing on dissolution of the S ciety and transfer 
of its assets.58 The Court also held that deviation from specific provi-
sions of the trust, now incapable of fulfillment, was not permissible be-
cause it would upset Tyler's stated impact. The Couh: stated that "the 
limited purposes for which the Society, while in existence, was obliged 
to use the trust income indicate that the restrictions imposed by Tyler 
were not merely subordinate details." 50 The Court added that the 
provision for disposition of excess income to other beneficiaries confirmed 
its view that the restricted uses of the trust were I central to Tyler's 
overall plan. 60 
I 
Finally, the Court turned to the appellant's contention that the doc-
trine of cy pres should be applied to the Tyler Fund. Because cy pres 
cannot be applied without a general charitable inten~ by the testator,61 
the Court looked to the circumstances surrounding t e bequest. Tyler 
was a founder of the Somerville Society who was lso aware of the 
53 Article Sixteenth of the will, which created the trust, read in part: 
[i]f the ... Society decline[s] to accept this trust with the obligations imposed, 
or if at any subsequent time in the future shall change its teligious tenets and 
cease to inculcate a Liberal Religion then I declare these bpquests annulled in 
[sic] inoperative and this estate hereby bequeathed witJ1 its accumulations 
both real and personal shall accrue equally to Harvard I and Massachusetts 
General for the same purposes as the excess income of the trust was to be 
used. 
1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1446, 376 N.E.2d at 1229. 
54 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1444, 376 N.E.2d at 1228. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1443, 1450, 376 N.E.2d at 1228, 1230. 
58 Id. at 1446-47, 376 N.E.2d at 1229. 
59 Id. at 1447, 376 N.E.2d at 1229. 
60 Id. 
Gl I d. (citing Wesley United Methodist Church v. Harvarb College, 366 Mass. 
247, 250, 316 N.E.2d 620, 623 ( 1974); Teele v. Bishop of rj>erry, 168 Mass. 341, 
343, 47 N.E. 422, 423 ( 1897) ). I 
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Association's existence. The conditional gift over to Harvard was con-
sistent with his Unitarian beliefs because the theological school was a 
center of Unitarian learning at that time. The conditional gift over to 
Massachusetts General reflected Tyler's long-term ties with the McLean 
Hospital. Thus, the Court concluded that there was no general intent 
to benefit religion, that Tyler intended to support the particular church 
he had founded and alternatively to support Unitarian teaching at Har-
vard and the poor at McLean Asylum. 62 The Court concluded that its 
construction of Tyler's will promoted his stated charitable intent and pre-
vented the fund from failing altogether and passing by intestate suc-
cession.63 The gifts over would be triggered not merely by the Society's 
failure to observe the restrictions, but also if the Society should "change 
its religious tenets and cease to inculcate a Liberal Religion." 64 The 
Court, reading this phrase disjunctively, concluded first "by dissolving, 
the Society has ceased to inculcate any religion . . ." thus triggering 
the gift over.65 
First Church in Somerville with First Bank & Trust Co. v. Attorney 
General,66 which was decided the previous Survey year, provides an in-
teresting comparison. In that case the Court held that the dissolution 
of the First Unitarian Society of Chicopee by merger with the Third 
Congregational Society in Springfield did not cause certain charitable 
trusts established for the Chicopee Society to cease and revert to donors' 
residuary estates.67 The Court determined that the trusts, which were 
intended to support Unitarian preaching in Chicopee, did not require 
that the preaching actually be done in Chicopee.68 The Springfield 
Society, in taking over the work of the Chicopee Society, made possible 
the continued preaching for the benefit of Chicopee residents, thus meet-
ing the testators' intents.69 
It is not clear why the Court determined that the Somerville testator 
only wanted to benefit a particular congregation but that the Chicopee 
testators wished to benefit whatever congregation would provide Uni-
tarian services for Chicopee residents. Perhaps the greater specificity 
attached to the Somerville bequests, which could not be met by the 
62 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1448-49, 376 N.E.2d at 1229-30. 
63 Id. at 1449-50, 376 N.E.2d at 1230. 
64 Id. at 1450, 376 N.E.2d at 1230. See note 53 supra for the text of the gift 
over. 
65 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1450, 376 N.E.2d at 1230. 
66 371 Mass. 796, 359 N .E.2d 938 ( 1977). First Bank & Trust Co. is discussed 
in DeGiacomo & Wyman, Trusts and Estates, 1977 ANN. SURv. MAss. LAw § 3.1, 
at 33-35. 
67 371 Mass. at 802-03, 359 N .E.2d at 942. 
ss Id. at 799, 802, 359 N.E.2d at 940, 942. 
69 Id. at 800, 802, 359 N.E.2d at 940, 942. 
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I 
Unitarian Universalist Association, was sufficiently distinctive from the 
more general Chicopee bequests, which could continue to be applied 
by the Springfield Society. It seems to be of no small importance that 
the Somerville bequest provided conditional gifts over 1o other charities 
while the Chicopee bequests provided a conditional reverter to the 
residuary estates of the testators. 
§10.6. Trusts: Administration. In Nexon v. Boston Safe Deposit & 
Trust Co.,1 the Appeals Court held that the trustee of a testamentary 
trust could not distribute the entire principal to the life !beneficiary, even 
though the trustee was given broad discretion to inva~e some or all of 
the principal for the life beneficiary. The life beneficiary, Nettie Zides, 
was the testator's sister and one remainderman, Abraham Zides, was 
Nettie's husband.2 The surviving trustee sought instructions from the 
probate court as to whether he could properly com~y with Nettie's 
request that all the principal be paid out to her.3 · he desired the 
principal in order to assure herself that the entire rem inder would be 
available for Abraham's support if he survived her.4 
The trust instrument provided that Nettie was to receive income for 
· life, with the trustees to invade principal if necessary t<~ ensure that she 
would receive $5200 per year.5 Additionally, the trust~es were allowed 
to· pay Nettie "at any time and from time to time, and [or any purpose, 
any part of the whole of the then principal . . . as they, in their sole 
discretion, shall determine to be necessary or advisab~lfor her support, 
maintenance and greatest comfort and happiness." 6 hile the testator 
desired that the trustees exercise their discretion "gen rously" in order 
to keep pace with the cost of living, he nevertheless directed that they 
dispense principal to the life beneficiary "solely with regard to her in-
terests and needs and without any regard whatever" t} the remainder-
men.' Not surprisingly, the trustee informed the prob te court that it 
would give Nettie the "greatest comfort and happiness' if she were to 
have the entire principal delivered to her.8 The probate court ruled 
that the trustee could not deliver the principal to Nettie in order to 
satisfy her desire to benefit Abraham.9 
§ 10.6. 1 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 841, 364 N.E.2d 1P77. 
2 Id. at 841, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. Abraham, whose interest would vest only if 
he survived Nettie, was to receive the lesser of $10,000 or one-half of the principal 
remaining on Nettie's death. Id. at 843, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. 
3 Id. at 841, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. I 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 842, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. 
6 Id. The quoted language is from the will itself. 
7 Id. at 842-43, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. Again, the quoted language is from the will. 
s Id. at 841-42, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. 
9 Id. at 842, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. 
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The Appeals Court affirmed.10 It read the phrase "greatest comfort 
and happiness" in conjunction with the immediately preceding words 
"support" and "maintenance." 11 The court expressly noted that no men-
tion of Abraham's support and maintenance was in the instrument and 
that the testator made clear that the invasion of principal was to be 
without regard to the remainder interest.12 Having characterized the 
trust as a support trust, the court went on to hold: 
It is the duty of the trustee to confine the expenditures of principal 
to Nettie's interests and needs as they arise during her lifetime, 
and it would be a violation of that obligation and an abuse of dis-
cretion were he to accede to her wish to pay out the principal of 
the trust to her for the ultimate benefit of Abraham even if that 
would result in her greatest comfort and happinessP 
The rationale for the court's holding is unclear. Would the result have 
been any different if the intended object of the life beneficiary's bounty 
were not named as a contingent remainderman? In other words, was 
the court seeking to prevent Abraham from taking more than the maxi-
mum one-half of the principal assigned him, thereby upsetting the testa-
tor's plan for him and hurting the other remainder interests? The court's 
holding may simply be that the words "greatest comfort and happiness," 
even when used as a standard for invading all the principal, are mere 
surplusage if the general tenor of the hust is for maintenance and sup-
port. Viewed in this light, it seems that in construing a trust instrument 
with inconsistent standards for expenditures, the court prefers a con-
servative construction which emphasizes preservation of the trust prop-
erty and meeting the necessities, and not extravagances, of the beneficiary. 
One aspect of the Appeals Court's construction of the trust seems 
aberrant. The provision that principal could be invaded without regard 
to the prospective interests of the remaindermen 14 most likely meant 
that the trustees should not be concerned with diminishing these inter-
ests and had nothing to do with affirmatively, albeit indirectly, enhancing 
one of the remaindermen's share in the trust, as the court had concluded. 
Some clarification of the Appeals Court's decision in Nexon can be 
discerned from its later decision in Mahoney v. Mahoney. 15 In Mahoney, 
the testator-a non-lawyer-drafted his own will, disposing of the bulk 
of his estate "to my wife, Anne Elizabeth Mahoney, IN TRUST for the 
1o Id. at 842, 844, 364 N.E.2d at 1078, 1079. 
11 Id. at 843, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. See text at note 6 supra. 
12 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 843, 364 N.E.2d at 1078. 
13 Id. at 844, 364 N.E.2d at 1079. 
H See text at note 7 supra. 
15 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1246, 370 N.E.2d 1011. 
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... purposes ... of provid[ing] continued operatio1i1 of the Park Na-
tional Bank of Holyoke ... of which I own the contr lling interest, and 
to provide an income for my wife, Anne Elizabeth ahoney, for her 
life as well as an income, if possible, for [the testator's ltwo sons Douglas 
and Stephen]." 16 The trust also provided that the sha~es could be voted 
to elect Douglas or Stephen to the board of director~of the bank and 
that Anne, the trustee, should have discretion to " articipate in any 
plan of reorganization or consolidation or merger in olving any com-
pany" whose stock comprised part of the fund. 17 Thf' most significant 
feature of the instrument was the one allowing An e, as trustee, to 
invade principal "for the necessity of providing for [ er] comfort and 
happiness if the income proves to be insufficient .... " 18 
I 
Upon the testator's death, Anne Mahoney was appointed executrix 
in December 1969, and during the following year she Began to distribute 
all of the assets of the estate to herself.ln She took I the position that 
the trust under the will was not cnforceable.20 In J~ly 1972, Douglas 
S. Mahoney filed a bill in equity seeking to establish he validity of the 
trust, to compel return of the trust assets, and to h ve a new trustee 
appointed.~ 1 A preliminary injunction was entered prohibiting Anne 
from transferring or conveying any of the trust prop rty.22 Later this 
injunction was modified to allow Park National share to be exchanged 
for Western Bank and Trust Company shares, which shares would be-
come subject to the injunction.2a The probate court entered judgment 
for the plaintiff, declaring the existence of a trust and directing appoint-
ment of a new trustee and transfer of the assets to he new trustee.24 
On appeal, Anne contended that the trust existed n name only and 
that its terms evidenced the testator's intent to confer n her full owner-
ship and control of the property.~" The Appeals Cou disagreed, hold-
ing that the provision of the will allowing Anne to in ade principal for 
her comfort and happiness "does not enable Anne to I call the principal 
at will. Any question in this regard has been settl~d by [Nexon]." 26 
The court further stated: "The instrument, read as a whole, unmistak-
16 Id. at 1247, 370 N.E.2d at 1013. 
17 Id. at 1247-48, 370 N.E.2d at 1013. 
18 Id. at 1250, 370 N.E.2d at 1014. 
19 Id. at 1248, 370 N.E.2d at 1013-14. 
2o Id. at 1248-49, 370 N.E.2d at 1014. 
21 Id. at 1249, 370 N.E.2d at 1014. 
22 Id. t 
23 Id. Douglas appealed from the modification of the injunc IOn. 
does not relate to trust law, it will not be discussed herein. 
24 Id. at 1250, 370 N.E.2d at 1014. I 
•M I 
26 Id. at 1250-51, 370 N.E.2d at 1014. j 
I 
Since this issue 
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ably indicates an intention to create a trust." 27 The court also found no 
error in the probate court's decision removing Anne as trustee since that 
court found her to be lacking in competence and knowledge to manage 
the property and, perhaps more importantly, to have a tendency to 
divert the trust assets to hersel£.28 
In Mahoney it seems that the court was on firmer ground in limiting 
the "comfort and happiness" clause of the will than it was in Nexon. 
The unhappy appointment of the life beneficiary as trustee with power 
to invade principal should naturally raise the court's guard in construing 
such a clause. Moreover, the will, though inartfully drawn, clearly con-
. ditioned invasion of pricinpal for the beneficiary's "comfort and happi-
ness," the very next words being "if the income proves to be insuffi-
cient." 2n These words together provide a sufficient standard to enforce 
a trust against a beneficiary-trustee's abuse of discretion, but they do 
invite· uncertainty for a lay trustee. 
Another trust administration case decided during the Survey year, 
Samuels v. Attorney Generaz,ao considered whether a fund originally es-
tablished for relief could be used to erect a building. The Order of the 
Knights of Pythias, a secret fraternal and benevolent society, voted in 
convention in 1922 to establish a relief fund for members of the Order.31 
The vote followed the recommendation of a lodge committee that some 
$14,000 surplus moneys previously collected for relief be maintained 
as a permanent relief fund instead of being used for constructing a 
Pythian social center in Boston. 3~ The committee rejected the latter use 
of the money as "not the proper aim for a fund raised for benevolent 
work." 33 Over the years the fund was augmented by annual levies of the 
Order's members and by gifts, bequests, and other sources. 34 The fund, 
which had been invested over these years, had a 1975 worth of approxi-
mately $980,000, with nearly all of its $380,000 in disbursements ex-
pended for relief.35 
27 Id. at 1251, 370 N.E.2d at 1014_. 
28 Id. at 1251-52, 370 N.E.2d at 1015. 
29 See text at note 18 supra. 
30 373 Mass. 844, 370 N .E.2d at 698 (1977). 
31 Id. at 846, 370 N.E.2d at 699-700. The resolution stated that the fund's 
purpose was: 
to provide immediate or temporary relief in cases of destitution and distress 
among the membership of the order of this Grand Domain, to assist in relief 
in cases of calamity within or without this Grand Domain; and especially to 
see that members who served in the World War are protected by way of relief 
to the same extent as if War Relief Fund continued in force. 
I d. 
32 Id., 370 N.E.2d at 699. 
33 Id. 
34 Id., 370 N.E.2d at 700. 
35 Id. at 847, 370 N.E.2d at 700. 
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I 
The annual convention of the Grand Lodge from tim~ to time amended 
the resolution governing the fund.36 The most sign~ficant amendment, 
added in 1966, allowed the fund "to expend such su~s for the advance-
ment of the Order as the Grand Lodge or the Execttive Council may 
prescribe, subject to the approval of the Commissio ers of Relief, and 
to assist transient members from other domains who
1 
may be found in 
distress in this domain." 37 : 
I 
After this 1966 resolution the fund was used to srdy the future of 
the Lodge, which was badly in need of revitalization ecause of a sharp 
decline in membership.38 As part of its "revitaliza "on program," the 
Lodge authorized use of the fund to purchase land nd to construct a 
regional hall for the Order.39 In a declaratory acti n brought by the 
Grand Trustees of the Lodge, the probate court ru ed that the funds 
were subject to a trust for relief and could not be appl ed for the purpose 
of acquiring land and erecting a hall.40 
The Supreme Judicial Court, quoting the Restate ent (Second) of 
Trusts,41 stated that a trust for the relief of members fa fraternal order 
and their families, as opposed to a trust for the or anization's general 
purposes, is charitable in nature.42 The Court not d that the fund's 
purpose was set forth by the 1922 convention vote.43 Therefore, money 
given to the fund for that stated purpose could only be applied to that 
particular purpose, and subsequent amendment of th t vote was ineffec-
tual to divert the fund from that original purpose.4 The Court con-
cluded with the remark that "those who contributed o the fund before 
1966 were entitled to have their money used for the tated purpose. It 
follows that the Fund cannot be used for the purcha e of land and the 
construction of a regional hall for use by the Lodge" 411 
The Court's opinion should not be read to mean t*at the entire- fund 
may not be applied to the construction program. By ireferring to donors 
before 1966, when the fund's purpose was broadened ~o go beyond relief, 
the Court seems to suggest that post-1966 donors wete giving to a new 
fund or at least a fund whose stated purposes embra~ed construction of 
36 Id. at 846-47, 370 N.E.2d at 700. 
37 Id. at 847, 370 N.E.2d at 700. 
ss Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 845, 370 N.E.2d at 699. 
I 
41 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 375, commen e (1959). 
42 373 Mass. at 848, 370 N.E.2d at 700. 
43 Id. 
44 I d., 370 N.E.2d at 701 (citing Animal Rescue League f Boston v. Assessors 
of Bourne, 310 Mass. 330, 334, 37 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 ( 192 ). 
45 373 Mass. at 849, 370 N.E.2d at 701. 
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a regional hall. ~ 6 Thus there seems to be no reason why the fund could 
not be segmented into pre-1966 property (and earnings based thereon) 
and post-1966 property (and earnings based thereon). Certainly, income 
attributable to property acquired before the 1966 amendment must con-
tinue to be applied to the original purposes of the fund. 
§10.7. Trusts: Accounting: Allocation of Taxation Expenses to In-
come or Principal. In New England Merchants National Bank v. Con-
verse (and two companion cases) 1 the Supreme Judicial Court consid-
ered challenges by guardians ad litem to accounts filed under the wills 
of Mary Ida Converse and Anne Shaw Proctor. The guardians claimed 
that the trustees should have charged income for a portion of federal 
capital gains taxes borne by principaP The problem arose because 
section 643 of the Internal Revenue Code allocates to current income 
beneficiaries deductions for state taxes on gains, trustees' capital com-
pensation, and other administration expenses. The local practice has 
been to charge these expenses to principal.3 Yet section 643 does not 
allow principal to claim these deductions when paying capital gains 
taxes.4 Although these testamentary trusts made no provision for the 
allocation of charges between income and principal, the guardians 
sought compensation to the trust fund from income beneficiaries for 
capital gains taxes on the amounts that principal had been unable to 
deduct.5 The probate court reported the matter to the Appeals Court, 
and the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.6 
The Court initially noted that it has not been the usual practice in 
Massachusetts to make the adjustment sought by the guardians.7 It 
recited that six corporate fiduciaries in Boston had provided estimates 
for change-over costs ranging from $1,485 to $17,000 and for annual 
allocation costs ranging from $18 to $100 per account.8 The Court then 
observed that the practice of making the adjustment is followed in 
Philadelphia but not in New York and Pittsburgh.9 
46 See text at note 37 supra. 
§ 10.7. 1 373 Mass. 639, 369 N.E.2d 982 ( 1977). The companion cases were 
Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Shaw, and Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. 
Converse. 
2 Id. at 640, 369 N.E.2d at 982. 
3 See id. at 641, 369 N.E.2d at 983. 
4 See I.R.C. § 643(a)(3). 
5 For the three trusts at issue, principal paid extra taxes of $3,191.53, $4,158.55, 
and $17,298.61. For these extra taxes the guardians sought compensation to prin-
cipal in the amounts of $2,584.32, $3,110.41, and $14,595.96. 373 Mass. at 640-
41, 369 N.E.2d at 983. 
6 Id. at 640, 369 N.E.2d at 982. 
7 Id. at 641, 369 N.E.2d at 983. 
s Id. 
9 Id. 
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Recognizing its power to order trustees to make eq itable adjustments 
so as to alter the impact of federal tax statutes,l0 th Court turned to 
the question of whether· this was a proper case for o dering such relief. 
It indicated that it probably would have allowed tru tees to make this 
adjustment if it had been faced with the question w en the deduction 
was first granted to income beneficiaries in 1954.11 I determined, how-
ever, that practical considerations militated against requiring the ad-
justment.12 Chief among these considerations were u air and disparate 
effects that an adjustment now, contrary to the settl d practice, would 
have on current income beneficiaries where several y ars accounts have 
not yet been allowed. The effect would be unfair b cause the current 
beneficiary might have to pay for several years' adj stment out of one 
year's incomeP It would be disparate because a adjustment now 
would only effect trusts with unallowed accounts, all wed accounts not 
being subject to reopen.14 Another consideration wa the Court's view 
that for the trusts under consideration the benefit t principal would 
be low compared to the expenses for making the ad~ustments.15 Thus 
the Court declined to "require the trustees to infur expenses they 
resist." 10 1 
The Court hastened to minimize the significance ot its holding, how-
ever. It pointed out that instruments drafted after 11954 17 commonly 
10 Id. at 642, 369 N.E.2d at 984 (quoting Holcombe v. Ginr), 296 Mass. 415, 417, 
6 N.E.2d 351, 354 (1937)). 1 
11 373 Mass. at 643, 369 N.E.2d at 984. i 
12 Id. at 643-44, 369 N.E.2d at 984. j 
13 The Court reasoned: : 
For a period of more than twenty years, the adjustment ow sought has not 
been made by corporate fiduciaries in Massachusetts. Ther may be numerous 
trusts where the adjustment has not been made, and whiph have unallowed 
accounts stretching back a number of years. The present leases involve some 
capital gains taxes in unallowed accounts for years as far ~ack as 1969. To 
make adjustments now for a period of several years migh~ be to deprive the 
income beneficiary, often the testator's widow, of badly nee ed current income. 
In some cases the income beneficiary at the time of the cap tal gains may have 
since died, and the adjustments might then require withfholding of income 
from a successor income interest. ! 
I d. 
14 Here the Court reasoned: i 
Accounts in large numbers must have been allowed in w 'ch the adjustment 
sought might have been but was not made. It is not s ggested that such 
accounts could be reopened. But the rule advocated by the guardians ad litem 
would require the adjustment in accounts not yet allowed covering some or 
all of the same periods as allowed accounts. Thus, account in trusts similarly 
situated might receive unequal treatment because of the ortuitous timing of 
their allowances. 
Id. at 644, 369 N.E.2d at 984. 
15 Id. 
16 Id., 369 N.E.2d at 985. i 
17 The trusts at issue were created in wills probated in 191~ and 1940. Id. 
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provide for this adjustment.18 The Court also reasoned that "[a]s to 
small sums, the equity of the adjustment is in serious doubt; . . . below 
some level the game is not worth the candle." 19 Finally the Court 
pointed out: 
Nothing we say here is intended to question adjustments made by 
a trustee who has been making such adjustments routinely over a 
period of years. Nor do we decide what is to be done where a 
trustee seeks to begin making such adjustments on some intelligent 
basis, or what is to be done if the inequity resulting from the Fed-
eral tax laws appears dramatic and significant. ... No such case 
is presented to us. 20 
One hopes that the impact of Converse will be as limited as the Court 
suggests. While the Court seemed to signal to trustees that they ought 
to make the adjustment, it appears that it will never require the adjust-
ment. The major reason the Court advanced for denying these guardians 
ad litem the adjustment was because the benefits to principal would 
be minimal. Yet another reason also advanced for not ordering the 
adjustment was that the adjustments might be too costly to some income 
beneficiaries. Surely what would be costly to income beneficiaries is 
of great benefit to principal beneficiaries. Conversely, what is of little 
benefit to principal beneficiaries cannot be too costly to income bene-
ficiaries. It is hoped that trustees will take the initiative and follow 
the Philadelphia practice, thereby obviating the problem. 
§10.8. Trusts: Construction: Settlor's Intent to Shift Federal Tax 
Burdens. The appellate courts of the Commonwealth were occupied this 
Survey year with deciding how certain trust instruments were intended 
to allocate federal tax burdens. Two of the cases 1 were concerned with 
how much of an estate tax marital deduction 2 the testator intended to 
create, and another case 3 was concerned with whether a testator had 
created only a special power of appointment, thus excluding the appoin-
tive assets from the donee's gross estate.4 A fourth case 5 presented a 
novel twist: whether the testator's language in a will manifesting an 
intent to maximize the estate tax marital deduction created an interest 
in the estate where there was no federal estate tax liability to begin with. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 I d. at 644-45, 369 N .E.2d at 985. 
§ 10.8. 1 Babson v. Babson, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2759, 371 N.E.2d 430; First 
Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1099, 375 N.E.2d 1185. 
2 See I.R.C. § 2056(a). 
3 Dana v. Gring, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2776, 371 N.E.2d 755. 
4 See I.R.C. § 2041. Section 2041 includes, in the gross estate, assets subject to 
a general power of appointment in the decedent. 
5 Young v. Dempsey, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 630, 363 N.E.2d 285. 
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I. INTENT TO MAXIMIZE MARITAL DED~CTION 
I 
Under section 2056( b) ( 4) of the Internal Revenue Code, the value 
of property passing to a surviving spouse and qualifying for the estate 
tax marital deduction is to be reduced by the amoudt of any federal or 
state estate or inheritance taxes which might be paid from the spouse's 
share. Massachusetts law provides, in general, that such taxes, "except 
as otherwise provided or directed by the will [or trust] involved, be 
charged and apportioned among beneficiaries." 6 Belcause of these two 
provisions, the Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that 
unless the decedent has, by the language of the w~ll or trust, clearly 
shifted the burden of payment of the tax to another ~ource, the amount 
of the allowable marital deduction will be reduced by the value of the 
estate and inheritance taxes, even if those taxes wer~ in fact paid from 
another source. 7 i 
Babson v. Babson, 8 the first Survey year case involving the marital 
deduction, decided the question of whether the testator's failure to insert 
the words "maximum marital deduction" in the clausb providing for his 
widow's share required the executors of his estate td charge that share 
with payment of the Massachusetts inheritance tax on future interests. 
Babson died in 1972, survived by his wife.9 The executors of his 
estate filed a federal estate tax return claiming thel maximum marital 
deduction.10 The executors also paid Massachusetts inheritance taxes 
from. the residue of the estate, including $110,840.15 ~~epresenting Massa.-
chusetts inheritance taxes on future interests in th trust created for 
Mrs. Babson.11 An auditing agent, of the Interna Revenue Service 
determined that the value of the marital deduction should be de-
creased by the amount of the state taxes on the tru~t's future interests 
and assessed a deficiency of $57,415.20.12 The exedutors paid the de-
ficiency and filed a claim for a refund. The claim was disallowed, but on 
appeal to the Appellate Division of the Regional Commissioner, the 
Appellate Conference agreed to recommend the ref~nd if the Supreme 
Judicial Court were to determine that Babson's will indicated his intention 
to receive the benefit of the maximum possible marital deduction.13 The 
executors thereupon brought an action in the Supr~me Judicial Court 
under General Laws chapter 231A, section 1, against all legatees and 
I 
I 
6 See G.L. c. 65A, § 5. . I 
7 See Ballentine v. Tomlinson, 293 F.2d 311, 313 (5th Cir. 1961). 
s 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2759, 371 N.E.2d 430. 
9 Id. at 2761, 371 N.E.2d at 432. 
1o Id. at 2762-63, 371 N.E.2d at 433. 
11 Id. at 2763, 371 N.E.2d at 433. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 2764-65, 371 N.E.2d at 433, 
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beneficiaries, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue. 14 The Commissioner expressly declined to appear, stating that 
he was immune from suit in the courts of the Commonwealth and did 
not intend to waive that immunity. The other named defendants did not 
appear.U' 
Before deciding the issue of the testator's intent, the Court considered 
whether there existed a controversy so as to make a grant of declaratory 
relief appropriate, in view of the non-adversarial flavor of the proceed-
ings. The Court held that there was a controversy within the meaning 
of chapter 231A, section 1, in that the executors were uncertain which 
fund would pay the estate taxes. 16 Thus, even though the Service would 
not be bound by the Court's decision, the remaining parties would be 
bound, and the executors would know which course to pursue. Addi-
tionally, the question of Babson's interest was purely a question of state 
law and thus appropriate for the Court's determination.17 
The Court then determined that the testator indeed had intended to 
fully utilize the marital deduction, notwithstanding his failure to employ 
the word "maximum" in the provision creating the marital deduction 
trust. 1s The Court arrived at this conclusion by construing the will as 
a whole, considering "[t]he accomplishment of identifiable tax objectives" 
as an aid to construction.l!' First, the provision creating the trust re-
ferred to and met the Internal Revenue Code requirements for a qualify-
ing marital deduction trust, particularly the grant of a life estate in Mrs. 
Babson with a general power of appointment and the right to income 
at least annually.20 Secondly, the testator stated that the trust was to 
be funded with assets equalling fifty percent of his adjusted gross estate, 
which was the maximum amount then allowable under the Code.21 
11iirdly, the testator stated in another clause that the will should be 
construed as intending the maximum allowable marital deduction.22 
Finall), the testator directed that the executors charge "all estate taxes 
occas·,oned by my death, and all inheritance taxes on present ... [and] 
14 Id. at 2759, 371 N.E.2d at 431. 
15 Id. at 2759 n.1, 371 N.E.2d at 431 n.l. 
16 Id. at 2767, 371 N.E.2d at 434. 
17 Id. at 2768, 371 N.E.2d at 435. Cf. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. 
Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967). 
H 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2769, 371 N.E.2d at 435. The pertinent provisions 
fron the will are set out in id. at 2761-63 n.2, 371 N.E.2d at 432-33 n.2. 
1'1 Id. at 2769, 371 N.E.2d at 435 (quoting Putnam v. Putnam, 366 Mass. 261, 
268, 316 N.E.2d 729, 735 (1974) ). 
20 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2769-70, 371 N.E.2d at 435-36. See I.R.C. § 2056 
(h)(5). 
n 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2770, 371 N .E.2d at 436. See I.R.C. § 2056( c) (1) 
V•lfore amendment by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1854. 
- 22 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2770, 371 N.E.2d at 436. 
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on future or contingent interests in property passing! or accruing from 
me . . . to the residue." 23 The Court deemed thle most significant 
indicia of the testator's intent to utilize fully the rmaximum marital 
deduction to be the maximum funding provision an the tax shifting 
provision. 24 
First National Bank of Boston v. First National Ba1k of Boston 25 was 
the other marital deduction case brought under chapter 231A, section 1. 
Here the bank as executor sued itself as testamentary trustee, as well 
as other parties with an interest in the estate, seeking a declaration of 
the testator's intent to utilize fully the marital deduction in creating a 
marital deduction trust.26 Again the proceeding wa~amiable; the only 
real adversary, the Service, was not even named as party defendant. 
Nevertheless, the Court had no doubt that the procee ng was adversarial 
because the determination of which assets should be the taxes affected 
the shares of the interested parties.27 , 
The will of Leon W. Crockett directed his trustee "to appropriate a 
portion of the estate to form a separate trust the value of which shall 
be exactly the sum necessary to obtain the maximum marital deduction 
in determining the Federal Estate Tax on my estate .... " 28 Like the 
trust at issue in Babson, this trust met the requirements of section 
2056( b) ( 5) of the Code by granting the life tenant widow income at 
intervals at least annually and granted her a generallpower of appoint-
ment over the assets.29 Unlike Babson,30 however,~he instrument did 
not have a provision apportioning estate and inheri ance taxes among 
particular assets.31 Thus, the question before the ourt was whether 
the testator had manifested an intent to maximize the estate tax marital 
deduction to the point of shifting taxes to non-marital deduction assets, in 
the absence of an explicit provision so stating. The Internal Revenue 
Service disallowed the part of the marital deduction for Massachusetts 
inheritance taxes due on the trust, probably because the will did not 
apportion the taxes.32 
23 Id. The Court stated that this language has been he!~ to shift taxes from 
specific bequests to the residue (citing Boston Safe Deposit I& Trust Co. v. Chil-
dren's Hospital, 370 Mass. 719, 723, 351 N.E.2d 848, 850-5~ ( 1976); Putnam v. 
Putnam, 366 Mass. 261, 268, 316 N.E.2d 729, 735 ( 1974) ). 
24 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2771, 371 N.E.2d at 436. 
25 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1099, 375 N.E.2d 1185. 
26 Id. at 1099-1100, 375 N.E.2d at 1185-86. 
27 Id. at 1100 n.1, 375 N.E.2d at 1186 n.l. 
28 Id. at 1100, 375 N.E.2d at 1186. 
29 Id. at 1100-01 n.2, 375 N.E.2d at 1186 n.2. 
30 See text at note 23 supra. 
31 1178 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1100-01, 375 N.E.2d at 1186. 
32 Id. at 1101, 375 N.E.2d at 1186. 
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The Court held that the testator's expression of intent to maximize 
the marital deduction, without more, "necessarily implies an intent to 
preserve the deduction unreduced by the amount of Federal estate tax 
and Massachusetts inheritance tax which might otherwise be allocated 
to the marital trust property." 33 The Court saw Crockett's silence in 
an affirmative light, stating: "A contrary intent is not to be found on 
examination of the will. Nowhere in the instrument is there language 
which suggests that Crockett intended that taxes or expenses of the estate 
were to be paid from funds set aside for the marital deduction trust." 34 
Thus the Court held that the executor was precluded from charging the 
marital trust res with any taxes or expenses.35 
Justice Quirico dissented in both Babson 36 and First National Bank 37 
and on the same grounds. In his view, the only controversy was be-
tween the plaintiffs and defendant beneficiaries on the one hand and 
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the other.38 Since the Com-
missioner declined to appear, the Court did not have the benefit of op-
posing briefs or arguments. Justice Quirico contended that in such cases 
the Court should abstain.39 
The procedural realities and substantive results of Babson and First 
National Bank may be distinguished from Boston Safe Deposit & Trust 
Co. v. Children's Hospital,40 which was cited in Babson.41 In Children's 
Hospital, the question was whether Massachusetts inheritance taxes 
should be paid by the marital fund established under the will of Seward 
M. Paterson or by the residuary beneficiaries, certain charities.42 The 
charities were represented, and the Court eventually determined that the 
residue in which they were to share would bear the burden of the tax.43 
Under the peculiar circumstances of that case, the estate's charitable 
deduction was reduced, and as a result, the federal estate tax was actu-
ally increased as a result of the Court's decision.44 
In a case in which there is a controversy between claimants to a 
fund there is no doubt that the Court must render a decision. Where, 
33 Id. at 1101-02, 375 N.E.2d at 1186. 
34 Id. at 1104, 375 N.E.2d at 1187. 
35 Id. at 1105, 375 N.E.2d at 1187. 
36 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2772-75, 371 N.E.2d at 436-38 (Quirico, J., dissenting). 
37 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1106-07, 375 N.E.2d at 1187-88 ( Quirico, J., dis-
senting). 
38 Babson, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2772-75, 371 N.E.2d at 436-38 ( Quirico, J., 
dissenting); First Nat'l Bank, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1106-07, 375 N.E.2d at 1188 
( Quirico, J ., dissenting). 
39 Id. 
40 370 Mass. 719, 351 N.E.2d 848 ( 1976). 
41 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2765, 371 N.E.2d at 434. 
42 370 Mass. at 722, 351 N.E.2d at 850. 
43 Id. at 725, 728, 351 N.E.2d at 851, 853. 
44 Id. at 725, 351 N .E.2d at 851. 
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however, the parties are all in agreement, as Justice Quirico pointed out,45 
the Court is without benefit of any briefs or arguments other than those 
advanced by the plaintiffs. There is a danger in s~u cases that the 
Court may find itself rubber-stamping the plaintiffs sition. Consider 
the Court's rulings in three "adversarial" proceedings re ative to the fed-
eral estate tax marital deduction. In Putnam v. PutnaJ 46 the Court, in 
holding that the testator intended to avail himself fully f the deduction, 
decided that no inheritance taxes should be charged to the marital trust 
res, despite an express provision to the contrary. In Babson the Court, 
in finding that the testator harbored a similar intention, was most im-
pressed by both an expression of intent to fund the trust to the fullest 
extent and an explicit clause directing that taxes attributable to the trust 
be paid out of residue.H Finally, in First National Bank the Court relied 
solely on the testator's expressed intent to fund the trust to the fullest 
extent and was unconcerned by the lack of a tax app~rtionment clause 
as was present in Babson.48 Moreover, Chief Justice Hennessey, who 
authorized both Survey year opinions, did not even re er to Babson in 
First National Bank. Thus, the Court has held in t ree cases that a 
marital trust should not be reduced by state inheritance taxes or expenses 
attributable to the trust where a) the testator directs that the taxes not 
be charged to the trust, or b) the testator directs that the taxes be 
charged to the trust, or c) the will is silent in this regard. 
While the cases illustrate how far the Court will go to find an intent 
to maximize the marital deduction, they also illustrate ow far the Serv-
ice will go to advance its position with regard to ta es payable from 
the marital share. Thus, while the draftsman can fe I confident that 
the client's intent to shift tax burdens and other expen es will find easy 
expression as far as the Massachusetts courts are concerned, the true 
objective should be to make this intent precise to a ert to the more 
critical eyes of the Service. The draftsman should be aware of this 
problem and should endeavor to spell out in the clearest possible lan-
guage the intention of the donor or testator regarding the payment of 
taxes and other expenses. Where the directions are specific the risk 
of litigation will be substantially lessened. 
II. INTENT TO CREATE TAXABLE GENERAL PoWER OF 
APPOINTMENT 
In Dana v. Gring,49 an action somewhat similar to thf cases discussed 
above, the executors of Helen Gring's will brought a complaint for in-
45 See text at notes 38-39 supra. 
46 366 Mass. 261, 268-71, 316 N.E.2d 729, 735-37. 
47 See text at notes 23-24 supra. 
48 See text at notes 33-35 supra. 
49 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2776, 371 N.E.2d 755. 
31
Hern: Chapter 10: Trusts and Estates
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1978
§10.8 TRUSTS AND ESTATES 2:37 
structions seeking a determination of her interest in a trust established 
by her father.50 The questions were whether under Massachusetts law 
Mrs. Gring held a general power of appointment or whether the trustees' 
discretion to distribute principal to her was limited by "an ascertainable 
standard relating to . . . [her] health, education, support or mainte-
nance" 51 and whether she, as one of the three trustees, had power to 
participate in any decisions relating to payment to her of such principal.52 
If she held a general power of appointment the assets of the trust would 
be includable in her estate under section 2041 of the Internal Revenue 
Code; if not, they would not be taxable.63 
This time the United States made a response to the state court action. 
It filed an amicus brief in which it argued that the Court should decline 
to decide the case because its decision would not "[affect] the nature of 
state property interests." 54 The Court disagreed, however, and deter-
mined that the provisions of the trust instrument relating to distribution 
of principal to the life beneficiary did provide an ascertainable standard.55 
Article Fourteen of the will of Frank B. McQuesten provided that a 
portion of the residue of his estate should be held by trustees for the 
benefit of Mrs. Gring. The trustees were "authorized to pay over to her 
from time to time such amounts of the principal for her own use as 
said trustees may deem necessary or advisable for the purpose of con-
tributing to the reasonable welfare or happiness of my said daughter or 
her immediate family." 56 Mrs. Gring was given a special testamentary 
power to appoint the trust assets to any of her father's lineal descendants 
then living.57 She was named as one of the three trustees of the trust, 
which contained a spendthrift clause limiting her right to alienate or 
assign the fund to her creditors.58 
The Court determined that the language used by McQuesten to guide 
the trustees in distributing principal-the "reasonable welfare or hap-
piness" of Mrs. Gring-did limit the trustees' discretion.59 The Court 
determined this "judicially enforceable, external, and ascertainable stan-
dard" 60 to be that "[t]he beneficiary is to be maintained in accordance 
with the standard of living which was normal for [her] before [she] 
5o Id., 371 N.E.2d at 756. 
51 See I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A). 
52 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2777, 371 N.E.2d at 756. 
53 See I.R.C. § 2041 (a). 
54 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2782, 371 N.E.2d at 758. 
55 Id. at 2784-85, 371 N.E.2d at 759-60. 
56 Id. at 2778-79, 371 N.E.2d at 756-57. 
57 Id. at 2779, 371 N.E.2d at 757. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 2784-85, 371 N.E.2d at 759. 
60 See Woodberry v. Bunker, 359 Mass. 239, 241, 268 N.E.2d 841, 843 ( 1971 ). 
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became a beneficiary of the trust." r.l The above sta-qdard is to be ap-
plied to trusts containing similarly broad language.62 1('he Court negated 
the importance of the word "happiness" appearing i~ Article Fourteen 
by noting the testator's concern that the trust fund be I conserved for the 
remaindermen. This concern was shown by the fac that McQuesten 
had limited Mrs. Gring's power of appointment to ineal descendants 
alive at his death and had made them takers in defa lt of appointment 
and by the fact that McQuesten had used a spend hrift provision to 
limit Mrs. Gring's power to reach the assets.63 us, because the 
trustees were obliged to consider the remainder inter~sts as well as the 
interests of the life beneficiary, they could not have distributed the entire 
principal to Mrs. Gring.6-1 ! 
Addressing the second issue in the case, the Couh held that Mrs. 
Gring as trustee did not have the power to participat~ in a decision to 
distribute principal to her. Since the non-participation of a trustee-
beneficiary is the traditional trust law rule, the co?rt held that the 
language in the will referring to decisions by "my trfstees" should not 
be interpreted to mean that the testator intended tal depart from this 
principle. 6" Thus, the Court determined, the testator j:neant the trustees 
other than the beneficiary.66 Any other construction! "would favor the 
tax authorities and no one else. The propriety of sqch a construction 
is not to be lightly presumed." 67 : 
III. INTENT To MAXIMIZE MARITAL DEnurkoN AS 
CREATING A MARITAL DEDUCTION GIF'"f;-
The Appeals Court's rescript opinion of Young v. iempsey 68 upheld 
the probate court's determination that where th testator's estate 
amounted to less than $60,000, and thus was not axable under the 
federal estate tax law then in effect,69 Article First ofl the testator's will 
passed nothing to his widow. 70 Article First purported ito give the widow 
outright only so much of the estate "as is necessary i . . to entitle her 
to the maximum credit available as a marital deduct+on" under section 
I 
61 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2785, 371 N.E.2d at 760 (quoting Woodberry, 359 
Mass. at 243, 268 N .E.2d at 844). I 
62 Dana, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2785, 2787, 371 N.E.2dl at 760; Woodberry, 
359 Mass. at 243, 268 N.E.2d at 844. 
63 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2786-87, 371 N.E.2d at 760. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 2788-89, 371 N.E.2d at 761. 
66 Id. at 2789, 371 N.E.2d at 761. 
67 Id. 
68 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 630, 363 N.E.2d 285. 
69 See former I.R.C. § 2052, repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-4l5, § 2001(a)(4), 90 
Stat. 1848. 
70 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 630, 363 N.E.2d at 2 5. 
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2056 of the Internal Revenue Code. 71 The Appeals Court held that 
the estate's full exemption from federal estate taxation meant that "there 
was nothing from which any of the statutory deductions, marital or other-
wise, could have been made." 72 Thus, the Court viewed assets equalling 
"the maximum credit available" and the amount "necessary" for such a 
credit to be nonexistent.73 
The court then examined other provisions of the will which buttressed 
its belief that "tax minimization was the testator's only purpose in includ-
ing the marital deduction gift. . . ." 74 Article Second gave the widow 
the residue of the estate in trust for her life but made her sole trustee 
and beneficiary with broad powers of invasion.75 Since this was "virtu-
ally the equivalent" of an outright gift, Article First was "superfluous 
except for its potential tax consequences." 76 Additionally, Articles 
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh manifested the testator's intent to benefit 
his children and their issue, if any.77 Construing Article First as passing 
property to the widow would wholly frustrate the testator's intent to 
benefit these parties. 78 
71 Id. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 630-31, 363 N.E.2d at 285-86. 
76 Id., 363 N.E.2d at 286. 
77 Id. at 631, 363 N.E.2d at 286. 
78 Id. 
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